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PURCHASES  BY STATE AND  LOCAL GOVERNMENTS have  long  been  the most 
rapidly  rising  component  of aggregate  demand.  While real consumption 
and investment  expenditures  have both doubled since the end of the 
Korean  war, and federal  purchases  have increased  barely  at all, state and 
local  purchases  of goods  and  services  have  almost  tripled.  They  have  grown 
at an annual  average  rate  of 5.5 percent  and now account  for over 10 per- 
cent of real gross  national  product  (GNP). 
For much  of this period,  the budgetary  surplus  for state and local gov- 
ernments  hovered  very close to zero, being negative  as often as positive 
and  never  amounting  to more  than $2 billion.  Recently,  however,  the sur- 
plus has grown at a remarkable  rate. It was only $0.7 billion as late as 
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1969  but then began a rapid  expansion,  reaching  $4.8 billion  in 1971  and 
$12.3  billion  in 1972-when it attained  an annual  rate  of almost  $20  billion 
in the fourth  quarter.  Though  special  factors  have accounted  for some of 
this  rise,  a 1972  report  on the  fiscal  policies  of President  Nixon and Senator 
George  McGovern  predicted  that the state and local surplus  would rise 
even  higher  under  both sets of proposals.' 
Grants  to state  and  local  governments  from  the federal  government  were 
undoubtedly  responsible  for much of the increase  in expenditures,  and 
possibly  the budget  surplus  as well.  Whereas  in 1954  these  grants  amounted 
to only $2.9 billion, by 1974  they are expected  to reach $41.6 billion, a 
thirteen-fold  expansion.2  And grants  are of current  interest  not only be- 
cause of their sheer growth. The recent enactment  of general  revenue 
sharing,  the administration  proposal  to convert  existing  categorical  grants 
to special  revenue  sharing,  and numerous  other  plans  to federalize  welfare 
payments  or  to provide  property  tax  relief  or  income  tax  credits  to state  and 
local  taxpayers-all indicate  that  fundamental  changes  are  occurring  in the 
form of federal  assistance  to states  and localities. 
The  increasing  importance  of the state  and  local sector  and  the changing 
role of federal  grants  point  to the need  for a more  thorough  understanding 
of the budgetary  behavior  of state  and  local governments,  particularly  the 
way in which  it is influenced  by intergovernmental  transfers.  To explore 
this topic, we first  estimate  a model of state and local fiscal  behavior  and 
then use it to examine  these  policy questions. 
We begin  by discussing  different  forms  of grant  assistance  and  how they 
might  be expected  to affect  the budgetary  behavior  of states  and localities 
differently.  These ideas underlie  our theory of state and local fiscal be- 
havior,  from  which  we derive  a consistent  set of estimating  equations  for 
state and local expenditures,  revenues,  and the budget  surplus.  The inde- 
pendent  variables  in these equations  are federal  grants  of various  types, 
income, relative  prices, previous stocks of financial  assets, and demo- 
graphic  variables. 
The model  is estimated  with two separate  bodies of data: (1) quarterly 
time  series  observations  on the entire  state  and  local sector  in the national 
income accounts  for the period 1954-72;  (2) annual  budgetary  observa- 
tions  for a sample  of ten urban  governments  for the period  1962-70.  While 
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the coverage  of the time series  sample  is more  comprehensive,  the pooled 
cross-section  data contain  information  on a wider  range of intergovern- 
mental  assistance  that  is more  finely  disaggregated  by function,  and there- 
fore helps to sharpen  the estimates  for certain  critical  parameters.  These 
empirical  results  are then used to judge how the state and local sector 
responds  to federal  aid of various sorts, especially  general  and special 
revenue  sharing,  and to interpret  the recent  spectacular  increases  of the 
state  and local budget  surplus. 
Federal  Grants 
Although  there  is a relatively  well-developed  theory  of the roles played 
by different  types  of intergovernmental  transfers,  most empirical  studies  in 
this area  have paid little attention  to it. They have usually  assumed  that 
grants  of whatever  kind affected  state and local government  behavior  in 
much  the same  way, disregarding  a theory  that  postulated  they  would  not. 
This approach  may have yielded  acceptable  predictions  of the growth of 
state-local  spending  as long as grants  increased  in volume  without  changing 
in structure,  but  it is clearly  inappropriate  now when  grant  policy  is under- 
going such a radical  restructuring. 
The theory of intergovernmental  transfers  suggests  that grants from 
higher to lower levels of government  can be classified  into three broad 
types. 
Case  A. Open-end  matching  grants,  under  which  the higher  level of gov- 
ernment  pays some portion of the cost of certain  state or local expendi- 
tures, thus effectively  reducing  their price, and the lower government  is 
free  to take  as much  of the grant  money  as it wants  at this  new  price  ratio. 
Federal  grants  of this type have all been in the welfare  area-for  public 
assistance,  Medicaid,  and social  services.  The response  of expenditures  by 
lower governments  to these grants  depends  on the price  elasticity  of de- 
mand  for the relevant  good or service:  The lower  level of government  in- 
creases  total spending  (from  its own  resources  plus  the grant)  by more  than 
the grant-and reduces  it on all other goods-if  demand  is elastic,  and 
increases  spending  by  less  than  the  grant-and raises  it on all other  goods- 
if demand  is inelastic. 
Case B.  Closed-end lwnp-sum transfers, under which the higher level 
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ernment without any effective restrictions on  its  use  or any change in 
relative prices. The recently enacted general revenue-sharing  program con- 
stitutes the first important federal policy of this type, though such programs 
have existed on the state level. The response of expenditures  to these grants 
depends simply on the lower government's propensity to spend budgetary 
resources rather than to reduce taxes or add to its surplus. In the normal 
case, in which both public and private goods have positive income elas- 
ticities, lump-sum transfers will stimulate some increased public spending 
and some tax reduction. Case B grants will also stimulate less total spend- 
ing per dollar of grant than case A grants if the demand for expenditures 
is at all sensitive to price changes. 
Case C. Closed-end  categorical  grants, through which the higher level of 
government transfers a limited amount of money to be used for a specific 
program. These grants are a hybrid of case A  and B grants in that the 
higher government lowers the price of the aided activity but limits the size 
of the grant. All important grant programs at the federal level except those 
already  noted have been of this type. Without any other restrictions, case C 
grants can be shown to have expenditure effects somewhere between those 
of case A and case B grants-less  than open-end matching grants because 
the limitation on funds diminishes the impact of the price reduction, and 
more than lump-sum transfers  because at least some price reduction occurs 
for the specified  activity. If limited to incremental  expenditures  above some 
base amount, however, case C categorical grants can increase expenditures 
by more than open-end case A grants that are not subject to such restric- 
tions.3 
These straightforward  ideas become difficult  to apply once diverse types 
of  expenditures are aggregated into  functional categories for  empirical 
study. For any one type of expenditure, open-end case A grants will stimu- 
late more spending per dollar of grant than closed-end categorical case C 
grants without other restrictions, which themselves stimulate more expen- 
ditures than lump-sum B transfers. But case C grants could be observed to 
have a larger impact per dollar on spending than case A grants if existing 
C  grant programs make more  use  of  effort maintenance requirements 
that confine aid to incremental expenditures in a certain category, or if C 
grants have been more extensively used to support activities that have not 
3. These propositions  are described  more completely  in James A. Wilde, "Grants- 
in-Aid: The Analytics of Design and Response,"  National Tax Journal,  Vol. 24 (June 
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previously been carried out at the state-local level and are therefore incre- 
mental expenditures  in effect. The situation is complicated even further  be- 
cause grants have different legal and administrative provisions, and be- 
cause they go to many different lower governments, special districts, and 
the like, all with presumably different behavioral responses. 
Recognizing that we cannot deal with all of these complexities, we have 
nevertheless tried to estimate the differing responses to various types of 
grants, first on an aggregate basis and then with some disaggregation. Our 
approach is to classify grants into the three types on the basis of informa- 
tion about the nature of the program, then to enter these grants as inde- 
pendent variables in regressions in order to estimate their separate effects. 
This approach allows us to  determine how state and local governments 
might respond to different types of grants and to changes in the restric- 
tions accompanying them.4 
In our model, case A open-end matching grants are assumed to reduce 
the price of the grant-aided goods and services by the fraction (1 -  MA), 
where MA  represents  the federal share of total expenditures  in the category 
and is the exogenous policy instrument. The dollar volume of transfers of 
the case B type, B, are simply added to  the budgetary resources at the 
command of state and local governments; the size of the grant is then the 
exogenous variable. With categorical case C grants, the lower level of gov- 
ernment is assumed to take the entire grant available (C) and this amount, 
along with the matching rate (MC),  is used as the exogenous policy instru- 
ment to determine the volume of "mandated" expenditures on the good 
or service supported by the grant, C/MC. This would be the level of spend- 
ing for this activity required  of the lower government in order to obtain the 
federal grant. Then the recipient government is assumed, in response to 
the mandated spending, to reduce its other "discretionary"  expenditures 
on these programs-the  amount it was spending in excess of C/MC. The 
degree to which lower governments reduce discretionary spending, which 
we will term the grant displacement effect, determines the location of the 
impact of case C grants between case A and B grants. If grant displacement 
4. In first  classifying  grants  and then estimating  their separate  effects,  our approach 
differs  from that of Martin McGuire,  who takes all grants  together  and estimates  the 
degree to which they reduce prices or increase  income. See his "Federal-Local  Inter- 
actions in  the Allocation of  Resources" (University of  Maryland, Department of 
Economics, 1972; processed).  Since we place no restrictions  on the relative  responses 
to different  types of grants, our treatment  could lead to similar  results, though within 
a framework  that permits  analysis  of the response  to changes  in grant  provisions. 20  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
is complete, so that the federal government is simply paying for part of 
what states and localities would have done anyway, categorical C grants 
are identical to lump-sum B transfers, and our estimates will reflect this 
equivalence. If grant displacement is incomplete, C grants will have larger 
effects on total spending than B grants, and possibly even larger effects 
than A  grants when the effective degree of effort maintenance in the C 
grant programs is high enough. 
A Model  of the Determination  of State  and  Local  Expenditures, 
Revenues,  and  Budget  Surplus 
These ideas about federal grants can be used to develop a model of the 
determination of state and local government expenditures, revenues, and 
budget surplus. The model incorporates an optimization procedure for the 
decision makers at the state-local level that parallels that used in the devel- 
opment of consumer demand functions for households. We first describe 
the objectives state and local officials seek in their budgetary policy, and 
then introduce the budget constraint that limits the attainment of these 
objectives. Maximizing the preference function subject to the budget con- 
straint leads to a system of equations determining expenditures, revenues, 
and the budget surplus.5  The budget constraint ensures that an increase in 
expenditures  must be financed by a grant, a rise in taxes, or a decline in the 
surplus. Similarly, the  equations  ensure that  exogenous  budgetary re- 
sources such as grants are completely allocated to all competing uses of 
funds. 
THE OBJECTIVES OF STATE AND  LOCAL BUDGETARY  POLICY 
We assume that state and local government budgetary policy has four 
main objectives: (1) higher current expenditures, whether locally initiated 
or resulting  from the need to match federal case C grants; (2) higher private 
5. This use of a maximization  theory for state and local governments  is similar to 
other recent contributions. See James M. Henderson, "Local Government  Expendi- 
tures: A Social Welfare  Analysis," Review  of Economics  and Statistics, Vol. 50 (May 
1968),  pp. 156-63; Robert P. Inman,  "Four Essays  on Fiscal Federalism"  (Ph.D. thesis, 
Harvard  University, 1971); Thomas E. Borcherding  and Robert T. Deacon, "The De- 
mand for the Services of Non-Federal Governments,"  American  Economic Review, 
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disposable incomes, resulting from either higher pretax incomes or lower 
state and local taxes; (3) greater  flows of services from the stock of tangible 
capital possessed by states and localities; (4) greater flows of services from 
the stock of net financial assets. 
Current  expenditures. Decision makers at the state-local level, whether 
they be government officials or, by virtue of their voting power, private 
households, are assumed to gain satisfaction both from expenditures  man- 
dated by federal categorical grants and from locally initiated discretionary 
expenditures. Total expenditures (purchases plus transfer payments) can 
be defined as the sum of mandated and discretionary  expenditures  through 
the identity, 
(1)  EXP=  E +  EM. 
Here EXP is total state and local expenditures  however financed, E is dis- 
cretionary expenditures, and EM is expenditures mandated by the federal 
grant, defined above to equal C/MC. Since the volume of mandated ex- 
penditures, determined by case C grants and their matching rates, are by 
definition exogenous, explaining E is tantamount to explaining EXP. 
The utility of state and local decision makers is then assumed to depend 
on the real value of mandated and discretionary  expenditures,  taken sepa- 
rately, adjusted for a measure of expenditure  needs that is discussed below. 
Formally, utility depends on, 
(2)  Qi =  E/PE +  YlEM/PE -  N, 
where PE is the expenditure price deflator to  put the expression in real 
terms, wyi  is the grant displacement parameter  that allows for a differential 
utility from mandated as opposed to discretionary  expenditures,  and N is a 
variable reflecting minimum expenditure needs. 
If the grant displacement parameter,  wyi,  is unity, mandated expenditures 
arising from case C grants and locally initiated discretionary expenditures 
lead to identical utility per dollar and can be considered perfect substitutes. 
In this event, categorical grants will turn out to have effects on total spend- 
ing identical to those of lump-sum transfers. If yi  is less than  1, on the 
other hand, mandated expenditures add less utility per dollar than do local 
discretionary expenditures; thus they must be only partially substitutable, 
the grant displacement is incomplete, and the effect of categorical C grants 
on total spending will be greater than that of lump-sum case B grants. 
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that change the marginal utility of expenditures, and hence spending pro- 
pensities, without directly altering the budgetary situation of local govern- 
ments. In principle many variables could meet these criteria; we tried a 
number of candidates but eventually settled on only three: (1) the number 
of school age children (KID), a proxy for education needs; (2) the number 
of families headed by females (FEM), a proxy for needs for welfare and 
other social services; (3) the robbery rate (ROB), which is the best empiri- 
cal proxy for needs for expenditures on public safety. We then let N be a 
function of these three variables and substituted this expression into equa- 
tion (2) in the maximization exercise.6 
Private disposable incomes. The objective of higher private disposable 
incomes makes utility a  positive function  of  pretax income (Y)  and a 
negative function of state and local taxes (F). But allowance must be made 
for the possibility that equivalent changes in taxes and in pretax incomes 
will not  necessarily lead to  the  same utility per dollar. If  the  state  or 
locality could be thought of simply as an aggregation of households that 
cared only about total disposable income and not about whether its source 
was higher pretax incomes or lower taxes, the relevant indicator of satis- 
faction would be (Y  -  T).7 But this may not be an accurate way to repre- 
sent the state-local budgetary process if elected representatives  imperfectly 
translate household preferences. In particular, if government officials have 
some  independent influence on  budgetary allocations,  they would  pre- 
sumably prefer disposable income to rise through a cut in taxes, for which 
they can take credit, rather  than through a rise in pretax earnings, for which 
they cannot. The community might then operate as if the utility associated 
with the disposable income objective were a function of 
(3)  Q2-72  YIP-T/P, 
where  72  sets the relative weight of private incomes and taxes in the prefer- 
ences of decision makers, and the expression is put in real terms by de- 
flating by the overall price level, P.  If 72  equals 1, decision makers are 
indifferent  between income increases and tax reductions; if 72 is less than 1, 
they prefer income to rise through a reduction in taxes. The relation be- 
6. These "need"  variables  correspond  loosely to the "supply"  variables  of James  C. 
Ohls and Terence  J. Wales,  "Supply  and Demand  for State  and Local Services,"  Review 
of Economics  and Statistics,  Vol. 54 (November 1972), pp. 424-30. The concept is also 
used  in the work  of McGuire,  "Federal-Local  Interactions,"  and Inman,  "Four  Essays." 
7. For a more detailed discussion of the conditions under which this proposition 
holds, see Wallace  E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism  (Harcourt  Brace, 1972),  Chap. 3. Edward M. Gramlich  and Harvey Galper  23 
tween the effect of private income increases and unrestricted lump-sum 
transfers on public spending will depend on this parameter -Y2.  The two 
have identical effects when the source of the money is immaterial  (Y2  1); 
and lump-sum transfers,  which are already in the public treasury  and there- 
fore do not require the painful act of taxation, have a greater impact on 
spending  if  Y2 is less than 1.  8 
The stock of tangible  capital. The third objective of state and local bud- 
getary policy is to increase the flow of services from the stock of tangible 
capital. If this flow is proportional to the actual stock of capital, the utility 
from this source is also a proportional function of the stock. 
To derive the utility expression, we begin with the identity, similar to 
that used for current expenditures, that total construction expenditures 
(CON) equals the sum of mandated (IM) and discretionary  (I) construction 
expenditures, 
(4)  CON=I  +  IM; 
IM  is again equal to (CI/Mc1), where CI and MC, equal case C construction 
grants and their matching ratio, respectively. 
Two types of capital can then be distinguished, that resulting from the 
discretionary expenditures of local governments (KO) and that resulting 
from mandated spending under current and previous categorical grants 
for construction (KM).  The  earlier procedure can  be  used to  define a 
parameter,  -y3, which measures the capital grant displacement effect in the 
same way that -yl measures the current grant displacement. With this pa- 
rameter as a utility weight, the capital term in the utility function is pro- 
portional to 
(5)  Q3  =  (1 -  )(KOQ1 +  73KM.1) +  I/PI  +  73IM/PI, 
where 6 is the rate of physical depreciation and PI the price index for new 
construction, and where the capital stock terms are both in real terms 
because they cumulate all past investments also measured in real terms.9 
8. We might label this phenomenon the "flypaper"  theory of incidence: Money 
sticks where  it hits. Ray D. Whitman,  in "Effect  of Revenue  Sharing  Upon State-Local 
Fiscal Effort: A Revision of Current  Theory"  (paper  prepared  for delivery  at the 1973 
annual meeting  of the Public Choice Society; processed),  also gives other reasons why 
72  might not equal 1. The argument  in the text is proven  formally  in Appendix  A. 
9. Expressions  for these two real stocks would be of the form, 
KO =  E  (1  -  )i(I/P1)_j;  KM  -  (1 -  )i[(l/McI)(CI/PIA]i. 
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This expression  can be written  in simpler  notation  as 
(6)  Q3=  K' +  I/PI, 
where 
K' =  (1 -  a)(KOc1  +  73KM-1) +  73IM/PP 
The stock of net financial assets. The fourth budgetary objective is to 
increase  the flow of services  from the stock of net financial  assets. Net 
financial  assets are defined  here as all components  of the net worth of 
states  and  localities  other  than  real  capital,  or as all financial  assets  less all 
liabilities.  This term  in the utility  function,  Q4,  is simply  given  by the real 
stocks  of financial  assets: 
(7)  Q4  =  (FA1)/(P)  +  (S/P), 
where  FA-1 represents  stocks  in the previous  period  and S is current  net 
financial  saving. 
DERIVING  THE ESTIMATING  EQUATIONS 
In the real world a government  obviously  cannot satisfy all of these 
goals simultaneously-spend  as much as it would like, tax as little as it 
would like, and maximize  stocks of tangible  capital  and financial  assets. 
Rather,  it will  have  to allocate  its limited  resources  among  these  competing 
objectives  according  to its perception  of the highest  priorities  at that par- 
ticular  time.  We describe  this  process  through  our optimization  procedure. 
Mathematically,  we maximize  the preference  function, 
(8)  U = F(Q1,  Q2,  Q33 QA)' 
subject  to a budget  constraint.  Since  each of the terms  in the utility  func- 
tion is assumed  to have positive but declining  marginal  utility, govern- 
ments  will  desire  a smaller  increment  of any Qi  the more  they  already  have. 
Governments  are assumed  to use the four discretionary  components  of 
equation  (8)-current expenditures  (E), construction  expenditures  (I), taxes 
(T), and financial  saving  (S)-to  adjust  to movements  in the exogenous 
variables  in (8)-expenditure  needs  (N), expenditures  mandated  by case C 
grants  (EM),  income  (Y), and  previous  stocks  of capital  and  financial  assets 
(K',  FA_)-in  such  a way as to establish  this  maximum  continually.  Solu- 
tion of this system  will lead to a set of estimating  equations  that describe 
how discretionary  expenditures  respond  to these  independent  variables. 
The budget  constraint  in this system  is 
(9)  X=I  +  E +  S-T, Edward M. Gramlich  and Harvey Galper  25 
where X (for exogenous budgetary resources) equals the algebraic sum of 
all nondiscretionary  items-lump-sum  transfers,  interest and principal  pay- 
ments on outstanding debt, and the matching expenditures on categorical 
case C grants. The precise composition of this variable is  demonstrated 
below and in Appendix A. 
The optimization procedure, which is also worked out in detail in Ap- 
pendix A, leads after a minor simplification to the following set of estimat- 
ing equations for the four discretionary components: 
[I/PI  =  g {(FA-1  +  X)/P, 
(10)  E/PE  (Y/P), (EM/PE), 
-T/P  [PE(1  -  MA)/P], 
(FA-1 +  X +  T)/P  -  E/PE -  I/PI  (R +  6)(PI/P),  K', 
KID, ROB, FEMI}. 
The fourth discretionary variable equals previous stocks  of  financial 
assets plus exogenous budgetary resources plus taxes less the two types of 
expenditures, with everything in real terms. This means that the sum of all 
four dependent variables is (FA-1 +  X)/P,  which is also the first inde- 
pendent variable. Such a system forces this variable to be allocated com- 
pletely to  expenditures, tax  reductions,  or  surplus accumulation, with 
allocation coefficients that sum to unity across the four equations. These 
coefficients thus describe how either previous balances or exogenous bud- 
getary resources will be split up among the four possible discretionary  uses 
with all other independent variables held constant. All other independent 
variables will, on the other hand, have coefficients that sum to zero across 
the four equations. These coefficients  will then change the allocation of any 
given level of exogenous budgetary resources in response to movements in 
the independent variables, without changing the overall total. 
The lagged stock of financial assets in the budget constraint term gives 
the  model  somewhat complicated dynamic properties. If  some  outside 
change were, for  example, to  increase expenditures, either taxes would 
have to rise or the surplus  would have to fall to preserve  the budget identity. 
Whenever the surplus does change, stocks of financial assets will be low- 
ered, leading governments to try to regain them either by increasing taxes 
or reducing expenditures. When they eventually do this, changes in the 
stock, or the current surplus, will cease. Financial assets are then acting as 
a buffer stock, with the surplus responding in the short run but not in the 
long run to changes in outside forces. 26  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
The remaining independent variables and their expected roles in  the 
budgetary allocation process are described as follows: 
Real income (Y/P).  Real income will make communities better off and 
induce them to  spend more on public goods  and to  increase stocks of 
capital and financial assets, by raising taxes (or reducing negative taxes). 
Mandated  expenditures  under  categorical case C grants (EM/PE).  We use 
the  exogenous  amounts  and  matching ratios  of  closed-end  categorical 
grants to determine the mandated level of spending under the grant pro- 
gram. States and localities are then free to vary their discretionary  spending 
(E) accordingly. If they reduce discretionary  spending, they must also either 
increase their accumulation of financial assets or reduce taxes. 
Relative prices. Relative prices alter discretionary spending and hence 
either taxes or the surplus. For current expenditures the appropriate price 
term is PE(l  -  MA)/P,  or the relative price of expenditures times the im- 
plied price reduction due to case A grants. For construction there are no 
case A grants; but the relative price term, (R +  a)(PI/P),  where R is the 
state and local interest rate and a the rate of depreciation, allows the bud- 
getary allocation to change in response to the opportunity cost of new in- 
vestment. 
Stocks of tangible  capital. The capital stock objective implies that states 
and localities will invest more the less capital they have, and vice versa. 
Our theory reflects this by including the previous stock of capital, whether 
grant supported or not, as an independent variable, which lowers new con- 
struction and raises the other uses of budgetary resources. Apart from the 
residual financing effect, the lagged stock of structures should have a spe- 
cial stimulative effect on current expenditures for maintenance and for the 
wages of those who work in them. 
Demographic terms. Each of these proxies for expenditure needs, KID, 
ROB, FEM,  which were described earlier, should increase expenditures 
and also either increase taxes or reduce the surplus. 
Quarterly  Time Series Estimates, Aggregate State and Local Sector 
NATIONAL  INCOME ACCOUNTS  DATA 
The time series estimates of the model described above are based on 
data from the national income accounts for the aggregate state and local 
sector. These data cover the activities of two quite separate governmental Edward M. Gramlich  and Harvey Galper  27 
Table 1.  National Income Accounts Budget for State and Local General 
Governments  and Social Insurance  Funds, 1971 
Billions of current  dollars 
Budget  item  Amount 
Revenues,  total  151  .8 
General  government  142.4 
Social insurance  trust funds  9.4 
Expenditures,  total  147.0 
General  government  145.1 
Social insurance  trust funds  1.9 
Benefit  payments  5.O 
Less: Interest  earnings  -3.1 
Surplus,  total  4.8 
General  government  -2.7 
Social insurance  trust funds  7.5 
Source: Survey of Current  Business, Vol. 52 (July 1972), Tables 3.3, 3.7. 
a.  Includes a small amount of transfers to general government. Figures may not add to  totals because 
of rounding. 
bodies, general governments and the social insurance pension funds for 
state and local employees. The overall budget statement disaggregated  into 
these two components is shown for 1971 in Table 1. 
The table indicates that the trust funds accounted for more than the en- 
tire state and local surplus  in 1971. Indeed, they have been chiefly responsi- 
ble for growing surpluses in other recent years. Since trust funds are accu- 
mulating liabilities for retirement  payments in the future, however, the im- 
plication of these high and rising surpluses  is not clear. A positive trust fund 
surplus simply means that current inflows exceed benefit payments, but 
gives no indication whether these inflows are sufficient  to meet future  needs. 
Only a comparison of current receipts with those required to maintain the 
actuarial position of the funds-a  measure that does not exist for state and 
local trust funds in the aggregate nor even for most individual funds- 
could resolve this question.10 
What is clear, however, is that the transactions of retirement funds are 
motivated by quite different considerations from those influencing general 
governments. Since the model  described here is meant to  refer only to 
general governments, we have eliminated all trust fund items from the 
10. See William B. Neenan, "Status of and Prospect for Municipal Retirement 
Plans"  (Urban Institute,  1973; processed),  for a more detailed  description  of the prob- 
lems and prospects  for trust funds. 28  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
budget identity and will hereafter deal exclusively with general govern- 
ments. The general government budget for 1971 is given in Table 2. 
Revenues consist of income, corporate, sales, and property taxes, along 
with  a  small amount  of  other revenues, plus  federal grants. We  have 
separated  grants into types A (open-end), B (lump-sum), and C (closed-end 
categorical), with type C grants divided into those for current expenditures 
and those for construction. Total expenditures  consist of construction and 
current outlays-each  distributed between mandated and  discretionary 
expenditures-and  interest payments minus  the  surplus of  government 
enterprises. 
Table 3 then displays the budget divided into its discretionary and non- 
discretionary components.  Because we  have  simply transferred various 
items from one side of the ledger to  the other, the budget identity still 
holds;  now,  however, it implies that the sum of  the four discretionary 
items-two  types of  discretionary expenditures plus the budget surplus 
minus taxes-equals  total nondiscretionary budgetary resources, X. 
Table 2.  National Income Accounts Budget for State and Local General 
Governments,  by Major Revenue and Expenditure  Items, 1971 
Billions of current  dollars 
Revenue or expenditure item  Amount 
Revenues,  total  142.4 
Taxes and other  113.1 
Federal  grants-in-aid  29.3 
Open-end  (A)  10.8 
Lump-sum  (B)  0.1 
Closed-end  categorical  (C)  18.4 
Construction  8.4 
Current  expenditures  10.0 
Expenditures,  total  145.1 
Construction  26.2 
Mandated  by federal  C grants  10.5 
Discretionary  15.7 
Other  purchases  and transfer  payments  120.5 
Mandated  by federal  C grants  11.5 
Discretionary  109.0 
Interest  payments"  2.8 
Less: Surplus  of government  enterprises  -4.3 
Surplus,  total  -2.7 
Retirement  of long-term  debt (gross)  7.8 
Cash flow surplus  -10.5 
Sources: Table 1 above; Survey of Current  Business (July 1972), Table 3.3; U.S.  Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, unpublished data. Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 
a.  Net of a small trust fund transfer to general government. Edward M. Gramlich  and Harvey Galper  29 
Table 3.  National Income Accounts Budget for Discretionary  and Nondis- 
cretionary  Components  of State and Local General Governments,  1971 
Billions of current  dollars 
Component  Amount 
Nondiscretionary  budgetary  variable  (X)  -5.4 
Federal  open-end  A grants  (MAE)  8. 7a 
Federal  lump-sum  B grants  (B)  0.1 
Less: Drain due to federal  closed-end  categorical  C grants, 
construction  (IM  -  Cl)  -2.1 
Less: Drain due to federal  C grants,  current  expenditures  (EM -  C)  -1  .5 
Less: Interest  and debt retirement  (D)  -10.6 
Discretionary  budgetary  variables  -5.4 
Construction  expenditures  (I)  15.7 
Current  expenditures  (E)  109.0 
Cash flow surplus  (S)a  -12.7 
Less: Taxes and surplus  of government  enterprises  (T)  -117.4 
Source: See Table 2. 
a.  An estimate of the income effect of A grants, the matching rate MA times a previous average of values 
for expenditures,  E, is included on the nondiscretionary  side of the budget. See text for discussion. Since this 
income effect is different  from actual A grants (Table 2), the budget surplus also has been changed. 
Three items in the table deserve special mention. Since the level of cate- 
gorical C grants is exogenous, the expenditures  from own sources necessary 
to match these grants, (EM  -  C) and (IM  -  C1), appear on the nondiscre- 
tionary side. These local expenditures are a drain on budgetary resources 
and thus become a negative component of the budgetary resource variable. 
A second matter requiring  explanation is our treatment of case A grants. 
These grants are included in the exogenous term in Table 3 to account for 
the income effect of  the implied expenditure price reduction. Like  any 
other price change, A grants operate through a substitution effect which 
shifts prices with budgetary resources constant, and an income effect which 
changes budgetary resources with prices constant. Even when states and 
localities do not respond to the price reduction implied by case A grants, 
they are still getting revenue from such grants based on previously planned 
expenditures  which they are likely to use as they do other nondiscretionary 
funds. To capture this income effect, we have included an A grant term in 
X, defining it as the current  matching rate, MA,  times a previous average of 
values for expenditures, k.11 
11. This adjustment  is a way of simplifying  an equation system that becomes non- 
linear when all prices are not the same. There is also a much smaller income effect 
working  through  the interest  and debt retirement  term, D, for the opportunity  cost of 
investment  expenditures.  See Appendix  A for details. 30  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
Finally, we have classified interest payments and the retirement of long- 
term debt as exogenous-the  first because they are determined  by current 
and previous market interest rates and the predetermined stock of debt, 
and the second because they too  depend on the predetermined stock of 
debt, as well as on its repayment schedule. This dependence in itself would 
not make debt retirement expenditures exogenous if states and localities 
were able to  prepay or refinance their debt so  as to  alter its payment 
schedule. But most of these governmental units are legally prevented from 
refinancing their long-term debt, and few have been known to prepay it. 
Thus for these purposes we have lumped debt retirement with interest 
payments as a negative component of X. 
The Estimates 
We estimated the model given in equation (8) with seventy-six quarterly 
time series observations from 1954 through 1972. All variables reflecting 
dollar flows were in real terms and all prices were entered as ratios, as 
suggested by the maximization exercise. We deflated all the dollar variables 
and demographic terms by population to correct for any common trends 
that might be introduced by sheer growth.12  Since the response of the state 
and local sector to  outside influences is likely to be sluggish even apart 
from the lag working through the surplus described above, we have also 
used distributed lags (denoted by L) for these independent variables, which 
are difficult to predict and for which we might expect a lag.13 
12. Another rationalization  for this technique  might be that expenditure  decisions 
are probably  made in terms of real services  delivered  per capita. We tried to take this 
reasoning  one step further  by assuming  that tax decisions  were made in terms of effec- 
tive rates on income, and to distinguish  between discretionary  taxes involving  changes 
in these rates and nondiscretionary  taxes involving changes  in income. This approach 
yielded results similar to those presented  here but somewhat  less reliable  statistically, 
possibly because discretionary  and nondiscretionary  taxes are difficult  to distinguish 
operationally. 
13. The three demographic  terms in the quarterly  model were all interpolations  of 
annual  numbers.  Since each of these series  was already  smoothed,  it did not seem worth- 
while to use distributed  lags for them. 
In addition,  it is especially  important  to compute  a lag distribution  for the expendi- 
tures implied by categorical  grants. These expenditures  are subtracted  from total ex- 
penditures  to compute the discretionary  component (see equation 1) at the same time 
that they are addedas  an independent  variable  in equation  (10). This procedure  builds  a 
negative  bias into the estimates  if there  is measurement  error  due to the timing  of federal 
categorical  grants.  We have attempted  to adjust  for this kind of error  by smoothing  our Edward M. Gramlich  and Harvey Galper  31 
Estimation of the equations proceeded in two stages. First, each of the 
four equations for the discretionary  variables  of equation (10) was estimated 
separately by ordinary least squares. These initial estimates were used to 
eliminate independent variables that did not work well in the equation for 
the dependent variable they should primarily affect, and to measure the 
shape of the lag distributions, the degree of serial correlation of residuals, 
and the size of the remaining standard errors. The estimated degree of 
serial correlation was high enough to justify using all observations in first- 
difference  form. Final coefficient estimates were then obtained from a sec- 
ond regression in which these first differences were stacked in such a way 
as to impose the budget constraint and ensure that each of the four equa- 
tions had the same weight in influencing the structure of the coefficients.'4 
The best estimates of this set of equations are given in Table 4. Some of 
the cells in the table are blank because the relevant coefficient was either 
insignificant or had an incorrect sign and was dropped from the specifica- 
tion.  But the only independent variable that did not  have the expected 
sign in any of the four equations was the relative price for current expen- 
ditures. This means that A grants have no price substitution effects in this 
version. 
The coefficients in the table give the impact effect in the first quarter of 
changes in the independent variables. Because resources not spent or used 
for tax reduction add to  the current surplus, they continue to influence 
budgetary allocations in future quarters. Ultimate long-run effects are dis- 
cussed in the next section. 
We retained the lagged resources term, L1/X,  despite its relatively low 
t-ratio because this was the only avenue through which construction re- 
sponded to changes in budgetary resources. (The current value of X has 
almost no effect on construction.) But even with relaxed standards of sig- 
nificance, we found no  influence of lagged resources on  current expen- 
ditures and taxes. 
series for all case C grants before subtracting  them from total expenditures,  and then 
using a distributed  lag on this smoothed  series  as the independent  variable  for categori- 
cal grants. 
14. The stacking  technique  is described  in Frank de Leeuw, "A Model of Financial 
Behavior,"  in James  S. Duesenberry  and others (eds.), The  Brookings  Quarterly  Econo- 
metric  Model of the United  States (Rand McNally, 1965). The stacked equations  were 
then weighted  by the inverse  of the standard  error  of the ordinary  least squares  estima- 
tion after correction  for serial correlation  to ensure  that equations  with large residuals 
would not unduly  influence  the overall  coefficients. ON  ~10  -Oq  ON  oON 
00  0 
P,~~~i-  ~  0- 
ci  ~  ~  ~  ~  c 
0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~' 
-n  ,+-  -4  i 
-1  C  ~411 
~~-~~-  ~~~  0  Ci  ci  -+cd  C 
t  ci  -  C0  0r  -e 
U,  5~~~~~~  55  o~~~~~~r  e~~~~-  o0  C 
'I  C  -  Cd  II  II 
o  II  -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~w  ~  4  4  P 0  2  4  ;  -C  0  Cd  Z  I  0  0,  to  bb  0 
C,13  cd 
Cd  "V  (1) Cd  0j) 
0j)  Cd  0  02  C  0 
cd (1)  00  0  0 0,2  Cd  0  OC) 00  ON  o 0  ON  cq  m  cq  00  ON  ON  0  0  a  C13 
0  0  cli  116  14  't  C)  CD  0j)  0j)  C,3  > 
'o  -O 
W2  'a x (1)  ".-- > 
cd  0  0 
C-,  31  oj)  0  Oj)  cd  o s-o  cd0  -C,3 
0  .-  >,  I.. -4  (1) Cd Cd 
cr  C'd  m  m  ,  w 
o  6 
cd  0  -o 0 
tb  U2 
C; 
0  0  -  00  I"  cl  .5 o 
U2  oj)  > 0 
cd 
-o  0  0  UM  .0,-m  E.0  UU  C,3 u  Cd  (1) 
0  U;  Cd 
o 
.0 
.-C  ON  ON 
0  2  ..  X  00 
't  W)  ON  0  E  0  4 
ON  a 
.0  I  0 
U  Cd  Cd a  CZ  0 "R  -  0  a  00 
0:2 0 w  .0  cd  0 
0  Cd  0  0 
0  cd  64  w  o  > 
E  Cd  0  0  ".0  0  0 
0  M  0,  w C-4 
0 >  t)J) o'Z  cd  M>  w.-,  cd  cd  E  W)  C-4  0  Cd 
c;  ,  .,  0j)  C4  -C,3  o  o  o  0  0 
-Z 
C,3  C,3  6  .  0  o  o 
C,3w 
ON  C,  3 -8 
"It  C)  C)  00  It  M  CN  04 t4  W  00C!  C,3 





0 cd  cl  U2 
00  1-4  0  Cd 




Cd  0 
0 
tr;  0(1)  0  0 
C',S' 
0 
cq cd  U2 
-0  0  cd 
0  u  - 
Cd  0  Cd 
cd 0  Cd 
0 -o  C's  U  o 
bj)  8 
u'Oo0r.  r.  cd  'Z  0  0 
0  0 
0  .0  Cd  0  r. 
o  0  W  ,  2 
W  'O 8  ,  0  to 
N  -  W  0  0  0  QU  W  -0  0  0 
cd  E  cl 
0  cl  cd r.  0, !e  0,  0 
o  Cd  .3  0 M0 E  10 
C6  u  b  0  u  0  Cd  (1)  10  2  0  C,3 
u 
44  -4  o  cl  Cd  cd 
0  r. 
C,3  I2  -0  'O  'Or. 
;0. 0  cd  -  ry)  W  0  0  u  -0,  (1)  U  "-).  6  .0  'O  C) U2  U  'o  Cd  0  E 
o  >1 
t)J)  10  .0  0  0  C,3 
.l  o  -W -u  ".0 
0  0  0  cd  -.  'O  C,3  0  o  +,z  t-  v 
Cd  0  0  Cd  Cd  C)  W  t  (1) ,  r.Z 
Cd  cd  Cd 
>  > > 
C)  Q  Cd  10 
Cd  (z  c  -C  11 
c  C4 04  r.  00  W,  IL 
Cd  W  .  C  u  eq  " e  40  <  04  t-  Cd 34  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
The coefficients for (X +  FA-1)  indicate a very sluggish response of 
both current expenditures and taxes to changes in previous balances or 
exogenous inflows of funds. A rise of $1 in some inflow-say,  lump-sum 
transfers-will  increase the surplus by $0.96 in the first quarter, with only 
a slight increase in expenditures and a small reduction in taxes. After one 
year the surplus will be higher by $0.75, with $0.25 going into expenditure 
increases and tax reductions; after two years the proportions are about 
fifty-fifty. Of the two, expenditures approach their equilibrium value very 
slightly faster than do taxes. 
The coefficients for mandated C grant expenditures indicate that the 
reaction of expenditures would be much faster in this instance. A rise in C 
grants will immediately increase total expenditures  by EM,  as given in equa- 
tion (1). Then discretionary expenditures will decline by an amount that 
equals $0.32 per doliar of change in EM  over a period of four quarters.  This 
decline in  discretionary spending will also  be reflected as  a rise in  the 
surplus, which ultimately again raises discretionary  expenditures  by a small 
amount. If matching rates are set equal to one, a $1 rise in C grants will 
stimulate $0.88 total expenditures in the first quarter, about $0.70 in the 
fourth quarter when the displacement effect has had time to  work, and 
about $0.75 in the eighth quarter, by which time the increase in the surplus 
has begun to feed back on expenditures. 
EQUILIBRIUM  CHANGES 
Solving these equations for their equilibrium properties once all lags 
have been played out provides a better idea of their long-run properties. 
This is done by determining the equilibrium stocks of capital and financial 
assets and substituting them into the relationships for current expenditures 
and the negative of taxes. The current surplus is unchanged in this equilib- 
rium, and investment is changed only by altered replacement needs. In 
these calculations we have added mandated C grant expenditures to dis- 
cretionary expenditures to produce results in terms of total state and local 
expenditures, a more familiar concept. The steady-state magnitudes are 
given in Table 5. 
Several results stand out in the table. A doliar of revenue sharing or of 
any other exogenous budgetary inflow will ultimately raise expenditures 
by $0.43 and lower taxes by $0.57. The current expenditure response to 
revenue sharing is roughly five times that of the response to private income, 0 
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an extra dollar of which eventually produces only $0.10 of current expen- 
ditures in equilibrium. This implies a relative utility weight, 72,  of 0.22 for 
income-that  is, that income received  in the public treasury  (X) has a much 
different effect from income received by private households (Y). 
The displacement of categorical matching grants is relatively slight in 
this version (,yj =  0.35), indicating that categorical case C grants with a 
matching ratio of unity will increase total spending by $0.80, almost twice 
as much as does revenue sharing.15  The expenditure  impact is even greater 
when matching rates are below unity, or when the federal government pays 
less than the full cost  of the expenditure program, because under these 
circumstances the initial level of mandated spending is higher, with this 
impact only partly offset by the negative income effect of the budgetary 
drain due to matching. By way of illustration, if matching rates were equal 
to their present average federal share of 80 percent (MC =  0.8), total ex- 
penditures would  increase by  $1.00-($0.80)(1/0.8)-through  the  man- 
dated C grant term in Table 5, to be offset by $0.10-(0.43)($1.25  -  $1.00) 
-through  the exogenous budgetary resource drain in Table 5, for a net 
increase of $0.90. This evidence of a fairly strong impact from categorical 
C grants appears to conflict with the estimated weak effects on spending 
of case A grants. However, as mentioned above, such a result could be ex- 
plained by effective effort maintenance requirements  for case C grants, re- 
sulting either from legal restrictions or from the fact that case C  grants 
have been used more extensively for new expenditure programs. 
The other variables operate in relatively predictable  ways. In order to fa- 
cilitate their interpretation, we have also presented these results in terms of 
elasticities, or ratios between the marginal coefficients and average ratios, 
for the relevant concept of discretionary expenditures. The income elas- 
ticity of discretionary expenditures is  1.08, implying that state and local 
discretionary expenditures grow slightly faster than income. The interest 
rate elasticity of expenditures is very slightly negative because the capital 
stock, whose operation and maintenance are responsible for some of these 
expenditures,  is negatively related to interest rates. The elasticity of expen- 
15. Computation  of these values for yi  and 72  is described  in Appendix  A and also 
in the note to Table 5. The effect of displacement  (yi  = 0.35) is calculated  as follows: 
The impact of $0.80 is 35 percent  of the way between  the impact if there were no dis- 
placement  ($1.00 when MC  =  1.0) and the revenue-sharing  impact  if displacement  were 
complete  ($0.43). Edward M. Gramlich  and Harvey Galper  37 
ditures with respect to  the number of school children is 0.81. This may 
appear high in view of the fact that only about half of total expenditures 
are for schools; but some other expenditures for social services, welfare, 
and public safety also depend partially on numbers of children. The elas- 
ticity with respect to the robbery rate is very small, as would be expected 
from the fact that it should raise expenditures on only a small portion of 
the expenditure  budget. The one variable with a coefficient that seems high 
is that reflecting  families headed by females. Though its effects should also 
be restricted  to certain types of expenditures,  it nevertheless  has an elastic- 
ity of  1.06, suggesting that it may be serving as a proxy for some  other 
influences. 
Although these results give some indication of the impacts of different 
types of grants, a fair amount of uncertainty remains. It is surprising  that 
the impact per dollar of case C grants appears to be greater than that of 
revenue sharing while the impact of open-end A grants does not. For reve- 
nue sharing itself, the results-that  somewhat less than half the  funds 
actually will augment expenditures-are  reasonably plausible, but the in- 
ference arises from a variable that has not included revenue sharing until 
now and for which the t-ratio is rather low. The next section then com- 
pares these inferences with those of the same model estimated with another 
body of data. 
Pooled  Cross-section  Estimates,  Ten  Large  Urban  Governments 
The equations presented in this section come from a budgetary model 
based on data for ten large urban governments. These data have the advan- 
tages, first, of permitting identification of aggregation effects, and, second, 
of including revenue-sharing money from state governments along with 
their other components  of  budgetary inflows. With these pooled  cross- 
section data, there is also enough information to disaggregate expenditures 
into functional categories and thus to estimate separate price substitution 
effects and  the  displacement propensities of  categorical grants for  the 
different  categories. 
One of the problems in using local government data is that jurisdictions 
overlap. Typically, residents in any one area will be served by a city or 
town government, a county government, and probably, for certain func- 38  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
tions, special districts. This makes it very difficult to examine the behavior 
of any one government in isolation, because it depends crucially on what 
all the other local governments serving the same geographic area are doing 
or have done in the past. We have tried to  get around this problem by 
choosing for our sample only jurisdictions that were served by one general 
government during the estimation period. A relatively homogeneous sam- 
ple of ten large urban city-county governments met this criterion: Balti- 
more, Boston, Denver, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Providence, 
St. Louis, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. We then defined for these 
cities a standard discretionary  public sector, consisting of education, public 
safety, social services (health and hospitals, housing), urban support (sew- 
age, sanitation, highways, parks and recreation), and general government, 
but excluding airports, water transport, mass transit, higher education, and 
some other items. All expenditures and revenues of general government 
and special districts within our standard public sector were part of the 
general government, and only net drains due to these excluded items were 
deducted from exogenous budgetary inflows (X).  Another negative com- 
ponent of X was the cost (net of federal case A grants) of city expenditures 
on welfare, which are basically set by state laws determining caseloads and 
payment levels and are therefore exogenous to cities. 
A further  problem concerns the fact that these large urban governments 
are typically surrounded by high-income areas that might limit their fiscal 
flexibility. Cities may feel unable to tax and spend as much as they like 
because these suburbs offer a potential tax haven to wealthy city residents.16 
We have allowed for this possibility by including real per capita taxes on 
suburban property in the model,  expecting increases in this variable to 
make city governments more willing to increase their own taxes and expen- 
ditures. 
Table  6  gives  the  pooled  cross-section equations,  using  annual first 
differences  stacked as before to impose the budget constraint and to ensure 
that all equations had the same weight in estimating the coefficients. We 
have disaggregated discretionary current expenditures into  five compo- 
nents, each with its own price (two of which are not significant) and federal 
and state categorical grant programs  (two of which are not present because 
there are no grant programs in these areas). In addition, no separate data 
16. For the original statement  that consumers  choose among tax and expenditure 
packages  of competing  jurisdictions,  see Charles  M. Tiebout, "A Pure  Theory of Local 
Expenditures,"  Journal  ofPolitical Economy,  Vol. 64 (October  1956),  pp. 416-24. Edward M. Gramlich  and Harvey Galper  39 
on investment are available and thus the entire current account surplus, or 
change in net worth (ANW), is included as the last dependent variable, 
where ANW is again defined by subtracting all other discretionary uses of 
resources from X.17 
Our attempts to include the level of net worth as one independent vari- 
able, and hence ensure that this stock would be unchanged in the long 
run, were not successful. Although such an equation can be estimated with 
fairly sensible long-run coefficients, the estimated time period over which 
this adjustment appears to take place is unreasonably long. Thus for the 
cross-section results we adopted an alternative specification that merely 
used the previous change in net worth as one independent variable, and 
hence did not fully distribute all changes in private income and budgetary 
resources to current expenditures and taxes. All  other independent vari- 
ables have a direct impact on expenditures and taxes, however, and their 
long-run effects can be determined apart from the behavior of the surplus. 
In contrast to the time series results of Table 4, the equations in Table 6 
show significant price substitution terms. Categorical federal grants now 
have statistically significant displacement effects for education, but not for 
the other two categories. (The coefficient is large and negative for urban 
support, but federal grants in this area are very small and the estimate is 
unreliable.) The suburban tax and robbery variables worked well, but not 
the school-age population variable, possibly because it is difficult to mea- 
sure between Census years for individual cities. The variable incorporating 
the number of families headed by females was not even included because it 
should mainly affect welfare, which is not endogenous in the cross-section 
model. Other demographic variables reflecting expenditure  needs-such  as 
the proportion of aged people in the population, population density, the 
poverty population, the nonwhite population-typically  did not yield very 
significant effects. 
EQUILIBRIUM  CHANGES 
The steady-state coefficients for these equations are given in Table 7. 
For exogenous budgetary resources and income, which had effects on the 
17. Since  our  pooled cross-section  equations  are  estimated  to only nine  time series  ob- 
servations  for any one city, using  lags on the independent  variables  imposes  a real  cost in 
terms of loss of information.  Thus we have not computed direct lags for any variable 
except grants  (see note 13). -  ~~~~~00 
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surplus,  we used the pattern  of coefficients  in the lagged  surplus  to deter- 
mine  the steady-state  effects.  Because  the other  independent  variables  did 
not affect  the current  surplus,  their steady-state  coefficients  are the same 
as the impact  coefficients  in Table  6. Again,  nondiscretionary  expenditures 
are added  in to present  the table in terms  of total expenditures,  and the 
five  functional  components  are  also summed. 
The effect  of a dollar  of revenue  sharing  on expenditures  is weaker  than 
in the time series  estimates,  with only $0.25 going to expenditures  and 
$0.75 to tax reduction.  This effect  is still roughly  five times the effect of 
income on expenditures,  meaning  that  Y2, the utility weight for income, 
remains  about the same as before. The effect of categorical  grants on 
spending  is lower  than before,  however,  because  the displacement  param- 
eters,  aYl, 713,  and 714,  are larger  than in the time series  estimates.  Each 
dollar  of C grants  now stimulates  between  $0.54 and $0.58 of additional 
spending  for education  and social services  and actually  reduces  spending 
for the small  urban  support  category.  The pattern  of these  estimates  sug- 
gests  that grant  displacement  is greater  the smaller  are  federal  grants  rela- 
tive to local discretionary  expenditures,  or the more likely cities are to 
spend  this amount  of money on programs  even in the absence  of grants. 
These  equations  also indicate  that  the three  significant  price  elasticities  are 
in the -0.7  to -0.9  range,  which  implies  that  A grants  stimulate  spending 
by about $0.80  per dollar  (see Appendix  A for calculations),  or by more 
than C grants.  The one exception  to this result  is education,  where  the 
price  substitution  effect  is absent  but where  categorical  grants  do stimulate 
more spending  than lump-sum  transfers  and A grants.  Such a finding  is 
again  inconsistent  with the theory  of grants  unless  there  is a high degree 
of effective  effort  maintenance  with case C grants  for education. 
The Impact  of Federal  Grant  Policy on State and  Local  Expenditures 
The  results  of this  paper  suggest  that  lump-sum  transfers  such  as general 
revenue  sharing  will, for the first  year, show up mainly  as an increase  in 
the accumulation  of financial  assets  by states  and localities.  As stocks of 
assets  rise,  governments  will be less inclined  to expand  them  further,  how- 
ever, and will gradually  use this new wealth  to increase  expenditures  and 
reduce  taxes. Ultimately,  after about five years, each dollar of revenue 
sharing  will enlarge  state and local spending  by about $0.43  according  to wID 
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the time series estimates and by about $0.25 according to the cross-section 
equations.18 Although neither set of coefficients is estimated with much 
precision, together they indicate that  a  sizable part of  revenue-sharing 
grants will result in reduction of state and local taxes below what they 
otherwise would have been. It also appears that revenue sharing will have 
less impact on expenditures than categorical grants but more impact than 
private  incomes. 
The estimated effects of categorical grants also differ between the time 
series and cross-section equations. In  the  time series versions, there is 
little evidence that categorical grants displace discretionary expenditures, 
with the result that grants increase total state and local spending by about 
$0.90 per doliar at present matching rates. Even this estimate is smaller 
than those reported by most other studies.19 More displacement is esti- 
mated in the cross-section equations; there, categorical grants for educa- 
tion and social services increase expenditures  by about $0.65 per dollar at 
present matching rates, and grants for urban support do not seem to in- 
crease expenditures even as much as do lump-sum transfers. In each case 
the displacement occurs quickly, so that expenditures and taxes are nearly 
at their equilibrium values by the end of the first year. 
The time series equations revealed no price substitution effects for case 
A grants, which means that their effects are no larger than those of lump- 
sum transfers and are even smaller than those of categorical C grants. The 
cross-section equations did uncover significant, and fairly sizable, price 
substitution effects in three of the five categories of expenditure. In these 
categories A grants would stimulate spending by about $0.80 per dollar, 
or by slightly more than would categorical C grants. 
Even if these numbers were perfectly reliable, they still would be difficult 
to use in appraising current policy actions regarding grants. General reve- 
nue sharing, for example, comes as close to being a pure lump-sum trans- 
fer as one would want. Yet even here, some restrictions are imposed on the 
18. We know of only two other studies that report coefficients  for the effect of 
lump-sum  transfers  on total expenditures.  John C. Weicher,  "Aid, Expenditures,  and 
Local Government  Structure,"  National Tax Journal,  Vol. 25 (December 1972), pp. 
573-83, finds this parameter  to be higher; McGuire, "Federal-Local  Interactions," 
finds  it to be lower. 
19. The most recent  paper on this topic is Thomas O'Brien,  "Grants-in-Aid:  Some 
Further  Answers,"  National Tax Journal,  Vol. 24 (March 1971),  pp. 65-77. A long list 
of previous studies was summarized  in Edward  M. Gramlich,  "The Effect of Federal 
Grants on State-Local  Expenditures:  A Review of the Econometric  Literature,"  Na- 
tional Tax Association,  Proceedings  of the Sixty-second  Annual  Conference  on Taxation, 
1969 (1970), pp. 569-93. Edward M. Gramlich  and Harvey Galper  45 
uses  to which  local governments  can put the money,  and expenditures  are 
subject  to a minor  additional  stimulus  due to a provision  that distributes 
money partly  on the basis of tax effort.20  Furthermore,  somewhat  more 
money per capita goes to poorer governments,  which may have higher 
spending  propensities.  And, finally,  local governments  may feel that the 
distribution  could be temporary  and that they must spend  the money on 
programs  to demonstrate  their  continuing  need. Although  the precise  in- 
fluence  of these  forces  is impossible  to determine,  the estimated  range  for 
the equilibrium  expenditure  impact  of $0.25  to $0.43  per dollar  of grant- 
approximately  $1.3 billion to $2.3 billion for a general  revenue-sharing 
distribution  of $5.5 billion-is  probably  somewhat  low. All things con- 
sidered,  general  revenue  sharing  ultimately  should  stimulate  approximately 
$2 billion to $3 billion of additional  expenditures  at the state-local  level, 
after  fairly  long lags. 
The administration  proposals  to convert  categorical  grants  to special 
revenue  sharing  are  even  more  difficult  to analyze.  The  proposed  legislation 
combines  many existing  narrow  categorical  grant programs  into broad 
special revenue-sharing  grants for education,  community  development, 
manpower,  and law enforcement.  All matching  requirements  and effort 
maintenance  restrictions  are eliminated,  as are many of the other  restric- 
tions on the uses to which  the grant  money  can be put. In analyzing  these 
proposals,  account  must  then  be taken  both of the nature  of the displace- 
ment operating  in the particular  grant being folded into special  revenue 
sharing  and of the types  of restrictions  included  in the legislation. 
In the limiting  case in which  the special  revenue-sharing  categories  are 
defined  so broadly  that states  and localities  have broad  scope  for internal 
displacement,  and in which  other  restrictions  are  minimal,  special  revenue 
sharing  will operate  much like a lump-sum  transfer.  In this event, con- 
verting  an average  categorical  grant  to special  revenue  sharing  will reduce 
state  and  local spending  by about $0.40  per dollar  in either  the time series 
or the  cross-section  estimates,  or roughly  $2.8  billion  in terms  of the admin- 
istration's  proposal  to convert  $6.9  billion  of grants.2'  In the other  limiting 
case, in which  all present  restrictions  are  continued  and the matching  rate 
20. See Charles J. Goetz, "Federal Block Grants and the Reactivity Problem," 
Southern  Economic  Journal,  Vol. 34 (July 1967),  pp. 160-65; and Richard  A. Musgrave 
and A. Mitchell Polinsky, "Revenue-Sharing,  A Critical View," Financing  State and 
Local Governments,  Proceedings  of the Monetary  Conference  Sponsored  by the Federal 
Reserve  Bank of Boston, June 1970 (FRBB, 1970),  pp. 17-52. 
21. Special Analyses, Budget of the United  States Government,  Fiscal Year 1974, 
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(Mc)  is simply  set at unity,  the average  reduction  in state  and  local  spending 
would be about $0.10 per dollar  in either  set of equations,  or only $0.7 
billion. The real impact should fall somewhere  between  these extremes, 
depending  on the provisions  of special  revenue  sharing,  but will probably 
fall closer  to the higher  figure. 
Apart from these effects  on overall  expenditures,  the interesting  social 
questions  concerning  categorical  grants  and whether  they should  be con- 
verted  into special  revenue  sharing  require  examination  of the program- 
matic  distribution  of funds  within  these  overall  totals.  This  paper  provides 
some  evidence  that  such  distributional  questions  are  important,  for the dis- 
placement  effects of present categorical  grants suggest that states and 
localities  may now to some extent frustrate  the implied  purpose  of the 
federal  grant  programs,  and  may  do so to an even  greater  extent  if present 
restrictions  on the use of the money  are  relaxed.  But to determine  the im- 
plications  of such shifts  requires  a much  more detailed  and disaggregated 
study  of the operation  of individual  grant  programs. 
The Meaning of Recent Movements in the State-Local Budget Surplus 
For the postwar  period  as a whole,  state  and  local general  governments 
have  greatly  enlarged  their  stocks  of tangible  capital,  partially  by increasing 
stocks of net financial  obligations.  Thus even though the net worth of 
general  governments  has  risen,  their  national  accounts  budget  has typically 
been in deficit  by about $3 billion annually.  This deficit  has been almost 
exactly  offset  by the retirement  fund surplus,  which has averaged  about 
the same amount, although these deficits and surpluses  have not been 
identical  at all times. 
In 1971  and 1972,  however,  this picture  changed  radically.  The overall 
state  and  local surplus  reached  a postwar  high of $3.8  billion  in the second 
quarter  of 1970  and  then,  after  slipping  back  briefly,  rose  to the  remarkable 
amount  of $19.5  billion  in the fourth  quarter  of 1972.  This sharp  increase 
has raised  some  eyebrows,  including  those  of David  Ott and  his associates, 
who have wondered  whether  the federal  government  was "impoverishing 
itself  while  putting  the states  and  local  governments  as a group  in a position 
of relative  fiscal  affluence."22  In this section  we use our  model to examine 
the implications  of this growth  in the surplus. 
22. Ott and others,  Nixon, McGovern,  and  the Federal  Budget,  p. 3. This phenomenon 
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Our  dynamic  theory  suggests  that changes  in the surplus  take the brunt 
of the immediate  adjustment  of state and local budgets  to outside  forces. 
For example,  most of any exogenous  inflow of funds initially  swells  the 
surplus,  and only gradually  affects  expenditures  or taxes.  Similarly,  in the 
first  round,  changes  in other  independent  variables,  such  as income,  prices, 
nondiscretionary  expenditures,  or the demographic  terms,  affect  the activ- 
ity to which they are directly  related  and the surplus;  later, they affect 
other,  competing,  activities,  which  are affected  by this change  in the sur- 
plus. Viewed  in this light, the surplus  is really the mechanism  through 
which  the lagged  response  of the entire  state  and  local budget  to an outside 
change  takes  effect-or the temporary  cushion  that allows  state  and local 
governments  flexibility  in planning. 
In the long run,  by contrast,  the surplus  is assumed  not to respond  at all 
to outside  forces.  Once states  and localities  have used exogenous  inflows 
of funds  to build  up their  stocks  of net financial  assets through  short-run 
surpluses,  they have no further  need to accumulate  or decumulate. 
These observations  underlie  an examination  of the experience  of the 
1970-72  period  reported  in Table 8. The first  row in the table gives the 
gross surplus  on the national  income  accounts  basis of the state and local 
sector,  the series  that has caused  all the excitement.  The second  row then 
gives our quarterly  estimate of  the surplus of  state and local retire- 
ment funds,  which  rose to $8.6 billion in 1972.  Earlier  we argued  that it 
was difficult,  if not impossible,  to read  this number  as an indication  of the 
financial  strength  of retirement  funds,  since  information  about  the present 
value  of their  contractual  obligations  is not available;  it follows  therefore 
that  it indicates  little  about  the financial  position  of state  and  local general 
governments. 
The  third  row  gives  the general  government  surplus  after  retirement  fund 
surpluses  have been deducted.  Before  these numbers  can be interpreted, 
two accounting  adjustments  must be made for special  factors  that arti- 
ficially  altered  the pattern of the surplus  in 1972. The first adjustment 
undoes  the effect  of an advance  payment  of public  assistance  grants  in the 
second quarter  of 1972, which raised  the surplus  $4.0 billion at annual 
rates  in the second  quarter  and will reduce  it correspondingly  in the first 
quarter  of 1973. The second adjustment  is for general  revenue  sharing, 
which was passed  by Congress  after the third quarter  was over, with a 
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double  payment  of $10.5  billion  ($5.2 billion  retroactive,  $5.3 billion  cur- 
rent)  made  in the fourth  quarter.  Table  8 retains  the current  payment  but 
line 5 and hence line 6 eliminate  the fourth  quarter  retroactive  payment 
from  the surplus. 
The resulting  adjusted  general  government  surplus  (line 6) looks much 
less remarkable  than the published  series  (line 1). There  was still a rise, 
totaling  $11.3  billion  between  the low point in the fourth  quarter  of 1970 
and the high point in the fourth  quarter  of 1972,  but this rise could have 
been expected  over the period. Our equations  indicate  that in the first 
quarter  of general  revenue  sharing,  more  than  95 percent  of the $5.3  billion 
disbursement  could  be expected  to be saved,  thus immediately  accounting 
for $4.8  billion  of this change  in the surplus.  In addition  over  the two-year 
interval  the growth  in real  income  was  responsible  for another  $1.5  billion, 
and the growth  in other grants  and the demographic  factors  (mainly  the 
decline  in numbers  of school  children)  for another  $4.0  billion;  the residual 
increased  only $1.0 billion.  In fact, after  account  has been taken of all of 
the independent  variables  in our equation,  the 1972  residuals  (line 7) do 
not reveal  anything  very  surprising:  They are not very  large  and are even 
negative  in the last two quarters. 
Moreover,  even  if all of the independent  variables  remain  at their  recent 
levels-and at least the grant  and demographic  variables  should  do so- 
this discussion  suggests  that  the high  general  government  surpluses  should 
be reduced  and eventually  eliminated.  Precisely  because  state and local 
governments  have  used  this period  to build  up their  stocks  of net financial 
assets,  they are likely  to use their  new-found  financial  cushion  to allocate 
their surpluses  into higher  flows of expenditures  or reductions  in taxes, 
with somewhat  more going to the latter according  to our estimates.23 
Whether  one believes  this  process  to be an unwarranted  "impoverishment" 
of the federal  government  then depends  not on the size of the surplus, 
which should  decline,  but on whether  one prefers  his tax reductions  and 
expenditure  increases  to occur  at the state  and local or national  level. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper  has been to assess  the role of federal  grants  and 
other  factors  in influencing  the budgetary  behavior  of state  and local gov- 
23. Notice that this statement applies only to  general governments.  There is  no 
reason why the trust fund surplus, and therefore  the overall state and local surplus, 50  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
ernments.  It has distinguished  among  three  different  types  of grants-those 
that operate  only through  prices,  those that operate  only through  bud- 
getary  inflows,  and those that have both price and income  effects.  It has 
estimated  equations  that allow for different  responses  for the different 
types of grants,  along  with income  and other  demographic  factors,  all the 
time  ensuring  that  the estimates  are  internaliy  consistent  from  a budgetary 
standpoint. 
Although  the results  are tenuous  and should  be accepted  with a good 
deal  of caution,  we find  that  pure  lump-sum  transfers  are  likely  to stimulate 
between  $0.25 and $0.43 of expenditures  for each dollar of grant.  This 
range  must  be adjusted  upwards  before  it is applied  to the recently  enacted 
general  revenue  sharing  due to several  minor  additional  stimuli  to expen- 
ditures  in the legislation;  thus we would expect $5.5 billion of revenue 
sharing  to increase  state-local  spending  by $2 billion to $3 billion. The 
administration's  proposal  to convert  $7 billion  of categorical  assistance  to 
special  revenue  sharing  is, on the other  hand,  likely  to reduce  overall  state 
and local spending  by $1 billion  to $3 billion,  according  to our estimates. 
Further,  we do not read  much  into the recent  sharp  growth  in the state 
and  local budget  surplus  on the national  income  accounts  basis.  Over  half 
the surplus  in 1972  was earned  by state  and  local retirement  funds;  but the 
surplus  is not a good indicator  of their present  financial  health.  The re- 
maining  portion resulted  directly  from the initiation  of general  revenue 
sharing,  cyclical  movements  in income, and the decline in numbers  of 
school-age  children.  But even  if these  forces  were  to continue,  we feel con- 
fident  that  the surpluses  would  ultimately  be reduced  in favor  of a combina- 
tion of higher  state-local  expenditures  and lower taxes. If a case is to be 
made against  revenue  sharing,  it is not that the present  state and local 
budget  surplus  is too high, but that the prospective  mix of additional  ex- 
penditures  and  tax reductions  has a lower  priority  than some other  federal 
use of this money. 
should stop growing. Ott and his associates  also seem to be somewhat  ambivalent  on 
their outlook for the overall  surplus  (Nixon, McGovern,  and the Federal  Budget,  p. 24). Edward  M. Gramlich  and  Harvey  Galper  51 
APPENDIX  A 
Derivation  of Estimating  Equations 
The Preference Function 
Assume  we have a utility  function  made up of quadratic  terms in the 
four objectives  mentioned  in the text (using  the same  notation): 
(A-1)  U =  2(ailQ  -  i )3 
~E  EmR  Q1 = p+  1t 
Q2  =  y2p  p 
Q3  =  K'  +pI 
Q  FA_1  +  S 
where  each  aij and Qi is positive. 
The expression  is maximized  subject  to the budget  identity 
(A-2)  I(1 +  R+  6)+  E(1-MA)+  S-T 
=  B +  CI-  IM  +  C  -  EM -D'  =X 
where  D' gives the interest  and debt retirement  payments  on previously 
incurred  debt  and  I(R +  6)  gives  them  on current  debt.  Solving  this system 
by differentiating  with respect  to each discretionary  variable  and setting 
these  derivatives  equal  to zero yields 52  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
(A-3)  a32  +  a42(PI/P)2(1  +  R +  6)2 
a42(PI/P)(l  +  R +  6)[PE(l  -  MA)/P] 
_a42(PI/P)(1  +  R +  8) 
a42(PI/P)(1 +  R +  6)[PE(1  -  MA)/P] 
a12  +  a42[PE(B  MA)/P]2 
a42[PE(-  MA)/P] 
a42(PI/P)(1 +  R + 6)  I/PI  ZI 
a42[PE(1  -  MA)/P]  E/PB  _  Z2 
a22  +  a42  -J  -T/P  J  Z3, 
with 
Z=  a3l  -  a32K'  -a4j(P1/P)(1  +  R +  6) 
+  a42(P1/P)(1  +  R +  6)[(FA-1/P)  +  (X,/P)] 
Z2  al  -  al271EM/PE  +  a12N  -  a4l[PE(l  -  MA)/P)] 
+  a42[PE(1 -  MA)/PI[(FA-1/P)  +(  X'/P)] 
Z3=  a2l  -  a2272 Y/P -  a4l +  a42[(FA-1/P) +  (X'/P)]. 
This set of equations  has numerous  multiplicative  terms in the price 
ratios and must be linearized  to simplify  the estimation.1  If we approxi- 
mated  the expression  by merely  dropping  the multiplicative  price terms, 
however,  we would  be ignoring  the  income  effects  of relative  prices,  interest 
rates,  and  case  A grants  and forcing  these  variables  to work only through 
1. Other  commonly used utility functions, such as that implicit in the Stone-Geary 
"linear  expenditure  system,"  also required  similar  transformations  to derive  linear esti- 
mating  equations.  The original  references  on the linear  expenditure  system  are Richard 
Stone, "Linear Expenditure  Systems and Demand Analysis: An Application to the 
Pattern  of British  Demand," Economic  Journal,  Vol. 64 (September  1954), pp. 511-27; 
and R. C. Geary, "A Note on 'A Constant-Utility  Index of the Cost of Living,'" Re- 
view  of Economic  Studies,  Vol. 18 (1950-51), pp. 65-66. That this system  is in fact non- 
linear in its parameters  can be seen from Richard W. Parks, "Maximum  Likelihood 
Estimation of the Linear Expenditure  System," Journal of the American  Statistical 
Association,  Vol. 66 (December  1971),  pp. 900-03. Edward M. Gramlich  and Harvey Galper  53 
their substitution effects. Whenever these substitution effects did not ap- 
pear, which was in fact the case in our time series equations for current 
expenditures and  for  some  of  the  cross-section expenditure categories, 
changes in relative prices and A grants would show no effect at all on state 
and local budgets. 
We have avoided this difficulty  by including the income effect component 
of all relative price terms in the budget resources variable. Since this vari- 
able ensures that all relative price terms have income effects, the presence 
or absence of substitution effects will then determine whether  A grants are 
more powerful than other grants. The new budgetary resources variable 
is written as 
(A-4)  X=  X'+  MAE-(R+  6)I=I+  E-T+  S; 
the A grant term is an instrumental variable approximating the inflow ot 
funds from this source and the  opportunity cost  on new investment is 
included in the variable defined as D in Table 3. Then the nonlinear price 
terms in (A-3) can be dropped, and the equation rewritten: 
(A-5)  I/PI 
E/PE 
-  T/P 
LFA/P 
(al2a22 +  al2a42  +  a22a42)  -a22a42 
1  -a22a42  (a22a32  +  a22a42  +  a32a42) 
AO  -al2a42  -a32a42 
L  -al2a22  -a22a32 
-a12%4  al2aU2aU  Z, 
-a32%42  a22a32a42  Z2 
(al2a32  +  al2a42  +  a32a42)  al2a32a42  Z3 
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where 
A0  = al2a22a32  + a12a22a42  + al2a32a42  + a22a32a42 
Z,  =  a31-  a32K' -  a4l(PI/P)(1 +  R +  6) 
Z2=  all  -  al27lEM/PE  +  a12N -  a4l[PE(l  -  MA)/P] 
Z3  =  a21  -  a2272 Y/P  -  a41 
FA/P  =  FA-1/P  +  X/P  -  I/PI  -  E/PE  +  T/P- 
Notice that this expression  has a fourth  dependent  variable,  equal to the 
deflated  stock of financial  assets, to ensure that the four discretionary 
variables  sum  to (FA-1  +  X)/P, its four coefficients  to unity, and the co- 
efficients  of each  Z to zero. This expression  is the one actually  estimated, 
after  substitution  for each  Z.2 
Equilibrium  Solution 
We can investigate  the equilibrium  properties  of these equations by 
assuming  that  both construction  expenditures  and the surplus  will be zero 
and E/PE-  T/P  =  X/P.  Equation  (A-5) becomes 
(A-6)  [E/PE  1 
[-T/PJ 
b32b42  -b32b42  b22b32b42 
Bo  L-b32b42  b32b42  bl2b32b42- 
blb -  bl27YlEM/PE  +  b12N  -  b41[PE(l-  MA)/P] 
b2-  b2272  Y/P-  b4l 
X/P, 
where 
Bo  =  bl2b32b42  +  b22b32b42. 
2. Strict  substitution  of Z, into (A-3) will lead to the conclusion  that K' will have the 
same coefficients  as FA-1 in the equations  for E,  -T,  and FA; and therefore  that K' 
should be added  to Ijust as FA-1 was added  to S. We did not make  this transformation 
in our estimation  because some current  expenditures  are necessary  to keep capital in 
operation  and thus allow the entire  capital  stock to enter  the utility  function.  This diffi- 
culty can be handled  by including  K' as an additional  argument  in N, which means  that 
its true coefficient  from  Z1 and Z2 is not a32, and hence  K' must be entered  as a separate 
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Here  we have replaced  all short-run  aij  coefficients  with their equilibrium 
bii  counterparts.  In the  text  we do this operation  numerically  by solving  the 
equations  for construction  and net financial  assets for their equilibrium 
stocks,  inserting  these stocks  in the equations  for expenditures  and taxes, 
and solving again for the equilibrium  coefficients  of the remaining  vari- 
ables. 
Effects  of Different  Types  of Grants 
These long-run equations  determine  the effects of different  types of 
grants  on expenditures.  Using only the relevant  coefficients,  we have 
(A-7)  EXP/PE =  E/PE +  EM/PE  =  (1/Bo)[(b12b32b42  +  b22b32b42)EM/PB 
-yjlbl2b32b42EM/PE  +  b32b42b41MAPE/P 
+b22b32b42(MA(E/P)  +  B/P  +  C/P  -  EM/P)]. 
The effect  per dollar  of A grants  is then 
(A- 8)  A(EXP/PE)/A(MAE/PE) 
=  (1/Bo)[b22b32b42(PE/P)  +  b32b42b41(PE/E)(PE/P)] 
This expression  equals  a/(l  -  MA),  where  a is the negative  of the elas- 
ticity  of real  discretionary  expenditures  with  respect  to relative  prices.  This 
illustrates  the statement  in the text that A grants  increase  expenditures 
more  the higher  is the elasticity  of demand. 
The per dollar  effect  of B grants  is unambiguously  smaller,  or 
(A-9)  A(EXP/PE)/IA(B/PE)  =  (1/BO)[b22b32b42(PE/P)]. 
And the effect per dollar of C grants (EM =  C/MC) is 
(A-10)  A(EXP/PE)/A(C/PE) =  (1/Bo)[b12b32b42(  -  T)(1  /MC) 
+(b22b32b42)(1/MC)(P-PE)/P  +  b22b32b42(PE/P)I 
If  yj =  1, that is, if the expenditures  mandated  under C grants  com- 
pletely displace discretionary expenditures, and if PE =  P,  C grants have 
effects  identical  to B grants  regardless  of the matching  rate. If eY] <  1, 
C grants have effects  larger than B grants, but, although  this exercise 56  Brookings Pavers on Economic Activity. 1:1973 
cannot show it, still smaller effects than A grants as long as there are no 
effort maintenance restrictions. 
Finally (A-6) indicates that the parameters describing grant displace- 
ment (,y)  and the relative utility weight of income and taxes (Y2)  can be 
computed from these long-run coefficients: 
A(T/P)/A(EM/PE) 
((T/P)/,A(X/P) 
(2  A(E/PE)/A(  Y/P) 
APPEND  IX  B 
Data Sources 
THIS  APPENDIX  LISTS the definitions of the variables used in the study and 
their sources. 
Time  Series  Estimates 
Federal grants by type and matching  ratio: Calculated by determining  the 
characteristics of each grant program from Catalog of Federal Domestic 
Assistance, Compiled for the Executive Office of the President  by the Office 
of Economic Opportunity (April 1970 and October 1971). 
Long-term state  and local  debt retired: U.S.  Bureau of  the  Census, 
Governmental  Finances, various years (adjusted and interpolated quarterly). 
Totalpopulation  andpopulation  aged 1-19: Economic  Report of the Presi- 
dent, Together  with the Annual  Report of the Council  of Economic  Advisers, 
January 1973, Table C-23 (interpolated quarterly). 
Families headed by females:  Bureau of the Census, Current  Population 
Reports, Series P-20, "Household and Family  Characteristics," various 
years (interpolated quarterly). 
Number of robberies: U.S.  Federal Bureau of  Investigation,  Uniform 
Crime  Reports  for the United  States, various years (interpolated quarterly). Edward M. Gramlich  and Harvey Galper  57 
Municipal bond interest rate: Moody's Investors Service, Aaa bond rate, 
as published in Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues. 
The following variables have been taken from various issues of the Sur- 
vey of Current  Business or from worksheets of the  U.S.  Bureau of  Eco- 
nomic Analysis (BEA), generously made available to us by Charles Waite: 
State and localfinancial data, including expenditures, receipts, and sur- 
plus (Survey, Table 3.4). 
State and local pension  funds data, including expenditures, receipts, and 
surplus (Survey, Table 3.7, interpolated quarterly). 
Price deflatorfor GNP (Survey, Table 8.1). 
Price deflators  for  state and local compensation,  construction,  and other 
purchases (BEA worksheets). 
Real GNP (Survey, Table 1.2). 
Federal grants to state and local governments,  by program (BEA work- 
sheets). 
Pooled Cross-section Estimates 
Financial datafor cities and suburbs:  U.S. Bureau of the Census, unpub- 
lished worksheets adjusted by the Urban Institute. 
Federal and state grants by type and matching  ratio: Calculated by deter- 
mining the characteristics  of each government program from U.S. Bureau 
of the Census, Census of Governments,  1967, Vol. 6, Pt. 4, State Payments 
to Local Governments  (1968), and Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, 
Compiled for the Executive Office of the President by the Office of Eco- 
nomic Opportunity (April 1970). 
Population  data: U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population, 
1960, Final Report PC (1), General Social and Economic Characteristics 
(individual state reports) (1961),  and  U.S.  Census of Population, 1970, 
Final Report PC (1), General Social and Economic Characteristics  (indi- 
vidual state reports) (1972) (interpolated geometrically between 1960 and 
1970). 
Number of  robberies: U.S.  Federal Bureau of  Investigation,  Uniform 
Crime Reports  for  the United States, various years. 
Personal income: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, "Personal Income 
by Major Sources and Earnings by Broad Industrial Sector," special com- 
puter tabulations prepared for the Urban Institute. 58  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
Consumer  price index: U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Consumer 
Price Index, various issues. 
Wages  for  teachers: National  Education Association,  Salary Schedule 
and Fringe Benefits  for  Teachers  (formerly Salary Schedules  for  Teachers), 
various years; calculated by averaging minimum and maximum annual 
wages for teachers with a B.A. degree. 
Wages  for firemen and policemen. International City Management As- 
sociation, The Municipal Year Book (Washington: ICMA, various years); 
calculated by averaging minimum and maximum annual wages for firemen 
and policemen. 
Wages in social services and basic urban support  functions: American 
Hospital Association, American Hospital Association Guide to the Health 
Care Field (Chicago: AHA,  various years); Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Wages and Related Benefits, various years (the  title  of  the publication 
varied over the period covered); annual earnings calculated by dividing 
annual payroll for hospital employees by the number of employees. 
Wages in housing, sewerage, sanitation, water supply, highways,  parking 
facilities, parks and recreation, and urban renewal: Set equal to  average 
hourly earnings for laborers in nonmanufacturing. 
Wages in social services and overhead  (general control and judicial, gen- 
eral public buildings, financial administration, protective inspection and 
regulation, general government, and miscellaneous commercial activities): 
Set equal to  average weekly earnings for office clerical workers in non- 
manufacturing. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Stephen Goldfeld: I enjoyed reading this paper, and wish to commend the 
authors for their efforts to estimate the effects of various grant policies on 
state and local government spending. 
I would like to outline several noteworthy features of this exercise. First, 
it is significant that the estimating equations are derived from an explicit 
model that ensures that everything that comes in must go out somewhere. 
This consistent additivity feature, which is often  absent in this kind of 
study, is an important aspect both in the short and in the long run. The 
second feature-also  a step in the right direction-is  the attempt to distin- 
guish between A, B, and C grants, and to allow for different income and 
price effects. Finally, it is noteworthy that the authors attempt to use both 
time series and cross-sectional data to answer their empirical questions. 
The main empirical conclusions that are drawn from the data are gener- 
ally plausible. However, the time series results unfortunately appear to be 
sensitive to the estimating procedures. As might be expected, a rather wide 
confidence band appears to surround the 0.43 estimate of the stimulative 
impact of lump-sum transfers, although no confidence band for that coeffi- 
cient is ever actually calculated due to  the complicated procedures that 
would be involved. In any case, the authors should not be faulted, as these 
estimates-especially  the time series results-are  presented very circum- 
spectly. 
Let me touch on several of the problems that I think are involved in this 
type of  analysis. First, it is difficult to  obtain much from a time series 
59 60  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
analysis of B grants, since they did not really exist over the sample period. 
Moreover, the X variable, which is designed to capture the same kind of 
influence as the B grant, is composed of very small numbers. Thus very 
little confidence can be attached to these particular estimates. 
Another problem is the variety of categorical (C) grants. For example, 
some types of C grants support currently existing programs while others 
fund brand new programs or incremental expenditure. If the mix of these 
types of grants changes over the sample period, then one would not expect 
to capture the effect of C grants with the single variable that is used in the 
paper. Basically, that variable would not have a constant coefficient. Fur- 
thermore, constructing  matching rates for the various grants is a very tricky 
matter. Indeed, in general, many of the variables in the paper are new and 
have rather uncertain properties. 
The reliance on distributed  lags in the model raises still more issues. To a 
degree, I share the consensus view that where there are distributed lags, 
there is trouble. In this paper, the problem is especially serious, since the 
lag distribution is imposed on a set of four equations that are bound by 
several constraints and that involve strongly correlated variables. 
Given all the pitfalls, Gramlich and Galper did a reasonably sensible 
job. They used ordinary least squares to get some feel for the distributed 
lags in each equation, and then essentially imposed the lags a priori when 
they estimated the equations together. They also made a number of simpli- 
fying, but necessary, assumptions, as in their weighting scheme and in their 
estimation  of  all  equations in  first-difference form.  I  should  mention, 
however, that a more elegant estimation technique relevant  to this empirical 
work has been developed; it arises out of econometric applications of con- 
sumer demand theory. The technique has been applied in the work of 
Barten and Theil, among others, and as it involves fewer assumptions than 
does the estimation procedure used in the paper, it might be worth trying in 
the present situation. 
In the underlying theoretical model, the authors view the bulk  of  ex- 
penditures, except for those associated with the matching of categorical 
grants, as discretionary. This view assumes that decision makers have the 
ability to reconsider completely their expenditures each period. I am not 
sure how it would be done, but it would be desirable to incorporate the 
fact that, once a program is started, it is not easy to turn off. Consequently, 
some of the expenditures  that the authors label as discretionary  may really 
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considered this problem on the tax side, but it also deserves some analysis 
on the expenditure side. 
To summarize, the time series results are sensitive to specification. Since 
the standard errors are hard to compute, the reliability of the point esti- 
mates cannot be accurately assessed. One important implication-or  at 
least indication-of  the time series results is that the relative price variables 
have only a negligible influence. Variations in the matching percentages of 
grants do not seem to affect the stimulative impact that is imparted to state 
and local government spending. The cross-sectional results are a bit more 
robust, and they do show some more important relative price effects. It is 
thus somewhat reassuring  that the point estimates from the cross-sectional 
data are not dramatically different  from the time series estimates. 
On balance, Gramlich and Galper have given us a valuable first effort at 
sorting out some important issues. Moreover, their paper should stimulate 
further research to pin down some of the issues associated with both the 
cross-sectional and the time series analyses. 
Martin McGuire: Hitherto, empirical work on state and local fiscal be- 
havior has consisted largely of more or less ad hoc regression analyses. 
These studies have shown uniformly that the increase in state-local expendi- 
tures associated with an increase of one doliar in exogenous grant money 
from the federal government  is much greater  than the increase in state-local 
expenditures arising from an increment of one dollar in the endogenous 
income of the state or local community. The distinguishing  characteristic  of 
the Gramlich-Galper paper is that it attempts to explain such phenomena 
in terms of a classical utility-maximizing model (thereby carrying further 
previous work by Gramlich), and I applaud the effort. 
One criticism, however, is that the functional form choosen for utility is 
inappropriate; rather than a quadratic utility function, the authors might 
better have chosen a logarithmic form. As  derived in the appendix, the 
"equilibrium solution" equation to be estimated is linear in income and 
prices, and the well known Stone-Geary utility function generates  just such 
a linear expenditure system, where every parameter has a well-understood 
and widely acknowledged interpretation.' Why devise a linear expenditure 
system by dropping nonlinear terms from a quadratic  utility function when 
1. For example,  see Arthur  S. Goldberger,  "Functional  Form and Utility: A Review 
of Consumer  Demand Theory" (University of Wisconsin, Social Systems Research 
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a direct  method is so readily at hand with the advantage that no such "sim- 
plifying" assumption is needed? 
In this connection the authors have pointed out to me that a Stone-Geary 
linear expenditure  system, if subject  to aggregate  consistency constraints on 
price and income parameters,  does not produce maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimates. Of course neither does the Gramlich-Galper  procedure of drop- 
ping terms produce such ML estimates of their quadratic utility function.2 
The Stone-Geary system subjected to the above mentioned constraints  is no 
longer linear in its parameters,  although procedures  (admittedly laborious) 
do exist for ML estimation of this Stone-Geary form. But assuming one is 
resigned to accepting some bias or inconsistency in the estimates, it seems 
preferable, when the  option  exists, to  choose  a  utility function whose 
parameters are identifiable from the econometric estimates. 
At a more detailed level the Gramlich-Galper  utility model proposes two 
parameters,  -yi and  Y2, to explain the "super-stimulativity"  of grant money. 
The parameter  72  measures the relative weight of private incomes versus 
taxes in the preferences  of local decision makers, in order to allow for the 
possibility that  local  officials might  retain for  local  public  spending a 
greater fraction of an exogenous unrestricted  grant than they would tax an 
equal endogenous increase in private income. This hypothesized prefer- 
ence is intuitively  appealing,  and the empirical  estimates of y2 are  reasonable. 
However, I have problems with yrl,  the "displacement effect" parameter. 
It implies that, when local officials  receive categorical grants for a particular 
function, they do not reduce the previously planned level of their own ex- 
penditures on that same  function by the same amount as they would if the 
grant were unrestricted; rather, the reduction due to categorical grants is 
only some fraction-approximately  0.35, as empirically estimated-of  the 
reduction due to unrestricted  grants. The authors interpret  this value of -1 
to mean that the utility to local officials  from these categorical grants is less 
than the utility they get from their own expenditures  in the same category. 
The problem is, what does -yl on this interpretation explain? It says that 
categorical grants do  not  generate as much "utility" for local  decision 
makers as do their own expenditures; but this is mere tautology. Why does 
that difference in utility exist? If the source of the difference is that man- 
2. Richard  W. Parks, "Maximum  Likelihood  Estimation  of the Linear  Expenditure 
System,"  Journal  of the American  Statistical  Association,  Vol. 66 (December 1971), pp. 
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dated and discretionary expenditures are for different  goods, then another 
good should be added to the basic demand model. 
Another comment relates to the distinction between discretionary and 
nondiscretionary  expenditures  of local governments. One reason for doubt- 
ing this distinction is that some purposeful federal strategy may lie behind 
the allocation of categorical grants. The federal "supply" of grants may in- 
troduce some simultaneous causal relationship; for example, the federal 
government  may purposely give big grants to poor states, or big grants with 
high matching rates to rich states. The possible presence of simultaneity 
should, therefore, be explored. More fundamentally, however, one ques- 
tions the realism of dividing total expenditures into  "discretionary" and 
"mandated" components, when the local government may have effective 
freedom to transfer "categorical" funds among categories. 
General  Discussion 
William Brainard amplified Goldfeld's and McGuire's comments about 
the difficulties of  defining discretionary expenditures. He  felt that some 
types of spending work on a ratchet-for  example, it is particularly diffi- 
cult to cut educational expenditures.  The levels are further  pushed up over 
time by increasing salary demands and the changing age composition of 
teachers. The asymmetry  of increases and decreases  in the expenditure  pro- 
cess may be fairly unimportant for growing communities, but critical to 
those that are stagnant or contracting. 
Brainard also observed that the variable that measures the number of 
school  children affects expenditure without  a  lag  instead  of  working 
through the desired capital stock relationship. He thought it somewhat 
unusual that  the  treatment of  this variable should differ from the lag 
structure of other variables. 
Walter Helier was puzzled by the estimates of the long-run effects of 
revenue sharing. He felt intuitively that state and local governments, in the 
long run, would spend more than the 43 cents per dollar of shared federal 
revenues that the authors estimated as the ultimate response. In any case, 
he observed that, at the present time, revenue sharing appears to have be- 
come in part a substitute for categorical grants and an excuse for cutting 
general federal government expenditures  as well. He remarked  that this de- 
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formulated by Joseph Pechman and himself, which stresses the distinction 
between categorical aids in support of specific functions of national  interest 
(because of externalities  and so forth) and revenue sharing  to cut down dis- 
parities  among, and increase  the capabilities of, state and local governments 
to support their own local functions. He recalled that he and Pechman had 
foreseen some substitution of shared funds for state and local taxes-a  de- 
velopment not necessarily to be lamented, but had expected the magnitude 
of that substitution to be much smaller than that estimated by Gramlich 
and Galper. Harvey Galper noted that the results presented  in the paper are 
quite consistent with the present political pressures for tax reduction. He 
pointed to specific announcements providing evidence that local govern- 
ments, in particular, are using much of the shared revenues for projects 
previously funded by local taxes, while others have applied large parts of 
their federal moneys to debt retirement. 
Edward  Gramlich wanted to clarify the meaning of  yl, the grant displace- 
ment parameter. Instead of measuring the relative expenditure reduction 
due to categorical grants, as McGuire said, it in fact measured the relative 
increase in total expenditures. If there were no displacement of categorical 
grants, yi would be 0 and total expenditures  would increase by the amount 
of mandated expenditures. If, on the other hand, displacement were com- 
plete, 71 would be unity and total expenditures  would increase only as much 
as they would under a lump-sum transfer. The parameter yi, which is also 
the relative utility weight for mandated expenditures, then measures the 
exact location of the expenditure  impact between these extremes. 
In addition, Gramlich reiterated  several reasons why the expenditure re- 
sponse to revenue sharing is likely to exceed the estimate of 43 cents per 
dollar.  First,  he  noted,  the  revenue-sharing law  contains  a  tax-effort 
formula that penalizes states for reducing their taxes. Second, the money 
may be distributed in a fashion differing from past patterns. For example, 
to  some extent revenue sharing will go to  poor  states that are likely to 
spend an especially large portion of the funds they receive. Finally, revenue 
sharing at this time is particularly  visible; and localities may perceive that, 
to the extent they reduce taxes in response to it, they will weaken their case 
for federal aid in the future. 
Arthur Okun raised the issue of how the large surpluses of state-admin- 
istered retirement funds are likely to affect aggregate demand. On a life- 
cycle  or  permanent-income view  of  the  consumer, the  pension  saving 
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the funds would exert a drag on the economy. Alan Greenspan  and Thomas 
Juster  cited both cross-sectional and time series findings that private saving 
rates are actually positively  correlated with  funded retirement saving. 
Hendrik Houthakker speculated that this empirical relationship may re- 
flect the transformation of the family structure; since parents are no longer 
supported by their children, they must rely not only on pension funds but 
also on increased personal saving as  sources for their retirement years. 
But Juster argued that the cross-sectional results could not be explained by 
changes in the family structure over time. People with pension coverage 
save at least as much in nonpension forms as those without coverage; pre- 
sumably, the need for retirement financing cannot be very different be- 
tween the two groups. 
In a comment related to the general state of state and local finances, 
Heller noted that an unusual coincidence of forces is basically responsible 
for the large state and local surpluses recently observed. These govern- 
ments are simultaneously receiving newly shared federal funds, enjoying 
the current economic expansion, and reaping additional funds from newly 
increased tax rates legislated in the previous years of adversity. In view of 
this situation, Heller expected that the surpluses will dwindle. 